Naznin Sultana

The search for lasting peace in the Middle East has long been framed through the prism of great power diplomacy-primarily negotiations involving Iran and the United States. Yet this framing, while convenient, is increasingly inadequate. Stability in the region cannot be imported or imposed from afar; it must be constructed locally. At the heart of this challenge lies a persistent and deeply complicated issue: Iran’s relationships with nonstate actors across the Arab Gulf and broader Middle East.

These relationships-often labeled as “proxies” by Iran’s rivals and “liberation movements” by Tehran-have become both instruments of deterrence and sources of instability. They represent a strategic architecture that Iran has built over decades, largely in response to isolation, sanctions, and conventional military constraints. Understanding this architecture is essential for any serious attempt to move from fragile ceasefires toward durable peace.

Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has operated under significant geopolitical pressure. Sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military limitations have constrained its ability to project power through traditional state mechanisms. In response, Tehran has adopted an asymmetric strategy: cultivating alliances with nonstate actors across the region. These groups, embedded within local political and social contexts, provide Iran with strategic depth and leverage.

However, reducing these actors to mere instruments of Iranian policy oversimplifies reality. Groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Palestine are not passive extensions of Tehran. They possess their own domestic constituencies, political agendas, and grievances. Iran’s support enhances their capabilities, but it does not fully define their behavior. This duality-local agency combined with external backing-makes the “proxy dilemma” particularly resistant to simple solutions.

For the Arab Gulf states, Iran’s network of alliances represents a direct security concern. These relationships blur the lines between internal dissent and external interference. Governments in the region often view Iran’s involvement as a deliberate attempt to destabilize neighboring states, exploit sectarian divisions, and expand its influence. From Tehran’s perspective, however, these alliances are defensive-a means of deterring adversaries and compensating for strategic vulnerabilities.

Bridging this perception gap is the central challenge. Diplomatic engagement between Iran and the Gulf states must move beyond rhetorical assurances and address the structural drivers of mistrust. Simply denying hegemonic ambitions, as Iranian officials often do, is insufficient. Confidence-building requires tangible steps that demonstrate a willingness to recalibrate regional behavior.

One potential pathway lies in redefining Iran’s role vis-à-vis its allied groups. Rather than acting as a sponsor of confrontation, Tehran could position itself as a facilitator of de-escalation. This would not require abandoning its relationships overnight-an unrealistic expectation-but rather leveraging its influence to encourage political integration and conflict resolution.

Yemen offers a critical testing ground for such an approach. The conflict has become one of the most visible arenas of Iran–Saudi rivalry, with the Houthis emerging as a central actor. Encouraging the Houthis to engage in constructive negotiations with the internationally recognized Yemeni government could signal a shift in Iranian strategy. A political settlement that incorporates the Houthis into a federal framework would not only stabilize Yemen but also demonstrate goodwill toward Saudi Arabia.

Lebanon presents a more complex case. Hezbollah’s role extends far beyond that of a militia; it is a deeply entrenched political and social force. Any attempt to address its military dimension must account for this reality. Forced disarmament is unlikely to succeed and could trigger internal conflict. A more viable approach would involve a gradual transformation, allowing Hezbollah to transition fully into a political actor while relinquishing its armed capabilities over time.

Such a process would require coordinated efforts between regional powers, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia. Despite their rivalry, the two countries share certain converging interests in Lebanon. Both seek stability and oppose outcomes that would undermine regional balance. This convergence creates a narrow but significant window for cooperation.

The broader question is whether Iran is willing to recalibrate its regional strategy in a way that prioritizes long-term stability over short-term leverage. This is not merely a diplomatic calculation; it is a strategic choice about the nature of Iran’s role in the Middle East. Continuing to rely on nonstate actors as primary tools of influence carries inherent risks, including escalation, miscalculation, and reputational costs.

At the same time, the Gulf states must also adjust their approach. Viewing every instance of domestic unrest through the lens of Iranian interference can obscure underlying political and social issues. Addressing internal grievances-economic inequality, political exclusion, and governance deficits-is essential for reducing the appeal of external alliances. Security cannot be achieved solely through containment; it requires resilience from within.

International actors, including the United Kingdom and other Western powers, can play a supportive role, but their influence is ultimately secondary. External mediation can facilitate dialogue, provide technical expertise, and encourage confidence-building measures. However, the core dynamics of Iran–Gulf relations are regional and must be addressed as such.

A sustainable framework for peace would likely involve a series of incremental steps rather than a grand bargain. These could include transparency measures regarding military activities, mechanisms for crisis communication, and agreements on non-interference. Over time, such measures could build the trust necessary for more ambitious arrangements.

Crucially, any framework must acknowledge the reality of nonstate actors rather than attempting to eliminate them outright. These groups are embedded in the political landscapes of their respective countries. The objective should be to integrate them into state structures and political processes, reducing their reliance on external support and diminishing their capacity for armed conflict.

The alternative-continuing the current cycle of proxy competition-offers little prospect of stability. It perpetuates a fragmented regional order in which conflicts are prolonged and solutions remain elusive. Breaking this cycle requires a shift in mindset: from zero-sum rivalry to conditional cooperation.

Iran’s relationships with nonstate actors are not an anomaly; they are a product of historical circumstances and strategic necessity. But they are not immutable. With careful diplomacy and mutual concessions, these relationships can evolve. The question is whether regional actors are prepared to undertake the difficult, often uncomfortable steps required to make that evolution possible.

Ultimately, peace in the Middle East will not be achieved through isolated agreements or external pressure. It will emerge from a gradual process of regional reconciliation, in which Iran and its neighbors confront their differences directly and pragmatically. Addressing the proxy dilemma is a critical part of this process-not because it is the only issue, but because it sits at the intersection of security, sovereignty, and trust.

If there is to be a path forward, it begins with recognizing that stability is a shared interest. From that recognition, a more constructive and less confrontational regional order can begin to take shape.