Naznin Sultana

The debate over peace talks with Israel in Lebanon is often framed in ideological or geopolitical terms, but at its core lies a struggle over authority, legitimacy, and control. Contrary to popular belief, Hezbollah is not fundamentally opposed to negotiations with Israel. Its real objection is far more strategic: it resists any process in which the Lebanese government, rather than itself, takes the lead. This distinction is critical to understanding why current diplomatic efforts pose a genuine threat to Hezbollah’s position within Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s power has long depended on its dual identity as both a resistance movement and a dominant political and military actor. Its narrative is built on confronting Israel and claiming to defend Lebanese sovereignty. However, when the state itself begins to negotiate directly with Israel, that narrative weakens. If diplomacy succeeds where armed resistance has dominated, Hezbollah risks losing its central justification for maintaining an independent military structure.

History makes this tension clear. In 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon after years of occupation. While this withdrawal is often credited solely to Hezbollah’s armed resistance, the reality is more complex. Indirect negotiations played a significant role. Swedish mediators, including Magnus Ranstorp and Magnus Norell, facilitated backchannel communication between Hezbollah and Israel. Even Ehud Barak sought mediation to coordinate the withdrawal.

This episode reveals an inconvenient truth: Hezbollah has engaged in negotiations when it suited its interests. The issue is not dialogue itself but control over that dialogue. When Hezbollah acts as the intermediary, it reinforces its authority. When the Lebanese state assumes that role, Hezbollah’s influence is diminished.

Today’s renewed push for talks under international support, particularly with backing from the United States, represents a direct challenge to Hezbollah’s dominance. It also revives memories of a pivotal moment in Lebanese history: the May 17 Agreement. That agreement, negotiated after Israel’s 1982 invasion, aimed to secure Israeli withdrawal in exchange for security arrangements. However, it faced strong opposition from Syria-aligned factions and groups that would later evolve into Hezbollah.

The aftermath was violent and destabilizing. Attacks on foreign embassies, the bombing of United States military barracks, and the assassination of Bachir Gemayel marked a period of intense upheaval. By 1984, the Lebanese state had effectively lost control of large parts of the country, and external actors filled the vacuum. This history continues to shape perceptions of any peace initiative, with many fearing a repeat of internal conflict.

Yet, invoking past violence to block present diplomacy effectively grants Hezbollah a veto over national decision-making. This is a paradox: Hezbollah has repeatedly drawn Lebanon into conflicts without broad consensus, yet demands full agreement when the state seeks peace. Such a standard entrenches paralysis and ensures that the status quo, which favors Hezbollah, remains unchanged.

Another argument often raised is that any Lebanese negotiating team must include all political factions. While inclusivity sounds democratic, in practice it risks making negotiations ineffective. Hezbollah’s participation could allow it to obstruct progress from within. By contrast, the 1983 negotiations were conducted by a focused team of professionals who consulted widely but retained operational independence. This structure enabled them to negotiate effectively and extract meaningful concessions.

The regional context further complicates the debate. Critics argue that peace talks are unrealistic given ongoing conflicts involving Israel in Gaza, Lebanon, and tensions with Iran. However, this perspective overlooks a broader trend: Israel’s relations with several Arab states have improved significantly over the past decades. Peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, along with normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates and others, demonstrate that diplomatic engagement is not only possible but increasingly common.

For Lebanon, the objectives of negotiations are practical rather than ideological. The primary goals include securing Israel’s withdrawal to internationally recognized boundaries, resolving border disputes, and enabling displaced residents of southern Lebanon to return home and rebuild. These are not abstract ambitions; they address immediate humanitarian and economic needs.

Ironically, achieving these goals would weaken Hezbollah’s grip on its core support base. Much of Hezbollah’s support is rooted in its role as a provider of security and services in areas neglected by the state. If the Lebanese government successfully restores stability and supports reconstruction, it could reclaim that role. This would shift the balance of power away from Hezbollah and toward state institutions.

The argument that Lebanon is too weak to negotiate effectively also deserves closer examination. Weakness can be a disadvantage, but it can also create urgency and attract international support. With backing from the United States and key Arab states, Lebanon has an opportunity to negotiate from a position strengthened by external support. Delaying talks may only reduce this advantage as regional conditions evolve.

Ultimately, the greatest threat posed by peace talks is not external but internal. It is the possibility of redefining authority within Lebanon. If the state proves capable of delivering tangible improvements, including security, stability, and economic recovery, it challenges the very foundation of Hezbollah’s dominance.

This is why Hezbollah resists state-led negotiations so strongly. Peace, in this context, is not merely the absence of conflict with Israel; it is a shift in Lebanon’s internal power structure. It represents a move from militia-driven politics to state-centered governance.

For Lebanon, the choice is stark. It can remain trapped in a cycle where non-state actors dictate war and peace, or it can attempt to reclaim sovereignty through diplomacy. The risks are real, as history shows. But so are the costs of inaction.

Peace talks, therefore, are not just about borders or treaties. They are about who speaks for Lebanon and who ultimately holds power within it.